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Candidate Ethnic Origins and Voter Preferences:
Examining Name Discrimination in Local Elections
in Britain
MICHAEL THRASHER, GALINA BORISYUK, COLIN RALLINGS AND
RICHARD WEBBER*
This article examines the relationship between candidate names as they appear on the ballot paper and
voting patterns in British local elections. Specifically, it explores whether some voters favour candidates
with British-sounding names over those whose names suggest either European or non-European ethnic
origins. Name classification software identifies three categories of candidate: British, other European and
non-European. Separate analyses of aggregate voting data are undertaken of multi-member and single-
member electoral districts. Data cover the period 1973–2012, and votes for more than 400,000 candidates
are examined. In multi-member districts, after comparing within-party slates and finishing order generally,
candidates whose surnames suggest a British ethnic origin perform best, while non-Europeans attract
fewer votes. The analysis of single-member districts focuses on a party’s vote share after taking into
account the pattern of candidate recruitment across electoral cycles. It shows that vote share is adversely
affected when British candidates are replaced by those with European and non-European surnames, while
the opposite pattern of succession is associated with a boost in votes. It is clear that the outcome of some
elections has been determined by the parties’ choice of candidates.
Ballot-order effects – the relationship between each candidate’s position and description on the
ballot paper and the number of votes received – have been investigated extensively. They affect
candidates in different ways, and have led some countries to introduce measures to remove
them. The identification of alphabetic bias, the tendency for candidates to gain an advantage in
votes solely by virtue of being placed at or near the top of the ballot paper, prompted the
randomization of ballot orders in Australia and some American states, for example.1 This
removes alphabetic bias, but sometimes replaces it with positional bias – the candidate placed at
the top of the ballot may obtain an advantage over competitors.2 The growing practice of
including candidates’ photographs on the ballot paper can lead to an association between
attractiveness and vote, giving some candidates an advantage over others.3 A third category of
ballot effect stems from voters’ reactions to names on the ballot paper as information cues about
the candidate’s gender, ethnic identity and/or religious affiliation.4 How voters react to name
characteristics is a more complex problem to address than alphabetic bias, and finding a
workable solution is considerably more difficult to achieve.
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1 Darcy and McAllister 1990; Miller and Krosnick 1998.
2 Koppell and Steen 2004; Meredith and Salant 2013.
3 Banducci et al. 2008; Johns and Shephard 2011.
4 Black and Erickson 2003; Edwards 2014; Kelley and McAllister 1984; King and Leigh 2010.
Prior research examining aggregate local election data in Britain demonstrates alphabetic bias to
the extent that there is a tendency for elected councillors to have surnames beginning with letters
located towards the beginning of the alphabet.5 Other signs of bias among locally elected
representatives in Britain include the under-representation of women and people from ethnic
minority groups. Analysis of the voting data demonstrates that women’s under-representation lies
more with recruitment and selection processes rather than voters’ reluctance to support female
candidates,6 but it is unclear whether the under-representation of minority ethnic candidates is
caused by supply-side issues or if some voters are reacting negatively towards such candidates.
Therefore, this article examines voting patterns for local authorities in Britain and tests for
evidence of name sensitivity that effectively leads to discrimination among candidates. It is an
over-simplification to maintain that evidence of name discrimination is equivalent to identifying
discrimination per se. In the context of local council elections, it may be that some voters prefer
to choose candidates that best fit the dominant demographic characteristics of the area – a case
of voting for ‘people like me’. However in the broadest sense, it is entirely valid to address
concerns in the wider society about the reaction of some voters to candidates based on their
ethnic identity, because this affects the nature of representative democracy. Policy makers
seeking greater social equality, political parties addressing problems of under-representation and
citizens wishing to engage in public life should be made aware that the electorate may respond
to such initiatives in different ways. Moreover, given some of the problems of measuring levels
of discrimination using either survey data or experimental methods, the opportunity to develop
alternative measures for exploring discriminatory behaviour should be embraced.
The article is divided into four sections. First, we examine the methods and typical problems
encountered when measuring discrimination before considering more specifically the
recruitment and electoral success of ethnic minority election candidates in Britain. Next, we
describe the local electoral data that permit an examination of votes for more than 400,000
candidates whose names are classified into three distinct ethnic origin categories. The
substantive analysis is presented in the third and fourth sections. The third section presents
evidence of name discrimination in multi-member electoral districts, while the fourth section
focuses on single-member electoral districts. Finally, we consider the consequences of these
findings for the electoral process itself, policy makers, party selection processes and the
continuing under-representation of ethnic minorities in Britain.
MEASURING DISCRIMINATION
Measuring racial discrimination is problematic, either among individual subjects and their
attitudes towards minorities or at the broadest societal level in terms of the causes of inequalities
in the distribution of resources. Individuals may disguise their real attitudes when asked about
matters pertaining to race because they are aware that some of these attitudes may be socially
unacceptable. Equally, some racially defined groups in society may be disadvantaged relative to
others, but the explanations for such differences are complex rather than a simple function of
race. Such problems led the authors of one of the most thorough reviews of the literature on
racial discrimination to conclude that, ‘[E]xamples of studies using methods that persuasively
measure the presence or absence of discrimination are rare, and appropriate data for
measurement are often unobtainable’.7
5 Webber et al. 2014; Wood et al. 2011.
6 Borisyuk, Rallings, and Thrasher 2007.
7 Blank, Dabady, and Citro 2004, 16.
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Since most people do not openly admit to being prejudiced, more subtle methods have been
devised to measure prejudice.8 These measures demonstrate that prejudice may operate in ways
that the person holding such views may not be conscious of them. However, there are problems in
interpreting these measures. For example, two recent meta-analyses of research publications that
employ the widely used Implicit Association Test (IAT) arrive at starkly different conclusions.
Although one report concludes that IAT measures are superior to those that expressly ask subjects
about their views on race,9 a second arrives at a diametrically opposite view and states that the IAT
provides little insight into who will discriminate against whom, and provides no more insight than
explicit measures of bias.10 Despite such disagreement, similar approaches are used for examining
political attitudes and behaviour,11 although the findings have been challenged.12
The strength of the association between vote choice and candidate ethnic identity is another
area in which disagreements are found. While some authors find little or no evidence of voter
bias,13 others identify a clear association between vote choice and attitudes towards race,14
although it is fair to say that the mechanisms that produce those feelings of antipathy towards
non-majority candidates remain far from clear.
Other studies have focused on how social norms towards racism evolve over time. Some
people may hold views about race but are reluctant to voice these openly for fear of
transgressing certain social norms.15 It is suspected that the growth of right-wing parties has not
always followed increasing anxiety about immigration in some European populations because
of the existence of an anti-racism norm.16 However, levels of prejudice may alter as the context
changes; for example, attitudes towards certain groups may ‘harden’ if that group becomes
associated with anti-social behaviour.17 Nevertheless, Robert Ford contends that the level of
discrimination in Britain is lower in the 1990s than it was in the 1980s, and that generational
effects contribute to this reduction.18
Concerns about discrimination towards ethnic minority election candidates are voiced when
the under-representation of such groups is discussed. The 2011 census found that 13 per cent of
the population is ‘non-white’ compared to approximately 9 per cent in 2001 and 6 per cent in
1991. Despite this growth in the population generally, only twenty-seven (4.2 per cent)
members of the House of Commons elected in 2010 are of ethnic minority origin.19 Ethnic
minority candidates standing in the 2010 UK general election comprise a slightly larger
proportion of candidates selected by the three largest parties: combined, the Conservative,
Labour and Liberal Democrats selected 136 minority candidates from a total of 1,893
candidates (7.2 per cent), although this still represents a degree of under-selection compared to
the overall population.20 Similar levels of under-representation are encountered in other
8 Dasgupta et al. 2000; Devine 1989; Greenwald et al. 1998; Pettigrew and Meertens 1995.
9 Greenwald et al. 2009b.
10 Oswald et al. 2013, 191.
11 Mendelberg 2008; Moskowitz and Stroh 1994; Moss-Racusin, Phelan, and Rudman 2010; Reeves 1997;
Sigelman et al. 1995; Smelser, Wilson, and Mitchell 2001.
12 Huber and Lapinski 2006.
13 Benson, Merolla, and Geer 2011; Black and Erickson 2006.
14 Clarke et al. 2011; Finn and Glaser 2010; Greenwald et al. 2009a; Pasek et al. 2009; Payne et al. 2010;
Piston 2010.
15 Plant and Devine 2009.
16 Ivarsflaten, Blinder, and Ford 2010.
17 Blinder, Ford, and Ivarsflaten 2013.
18 Ford 2008.
19 Dancygier 2013.
20 Rallings, Thrasher, and Cole 2012.
Name Discrimination in British Local Elections 415
institutions. Following the 2011 elections, just two members of the 129-member Scottish
parliament and two of the forty-member Assembly for Wales are of minority ethnic origin. The
Greater London Assembly has four ethnic minority members out of twenty-five, but this
percentage is about half the level within the capital’s general population.
The evidence regarding local government representation is similar. The 2010 census of local
authority councillors in England reports that only 4 per cent of councillors are of non-white
ethnic origin.21 Estimates of the proportion of minority candidates contesting local council
elections ranges from 1.7–9.4 per cent; the lower figure applies to the English shire county
elections, while the upper figure refers to the London-dominated elections held in 2010.22 There
is no question, therefore, that ethnic minorities are under-represented both as candidates and
among those elected to a range of political institutions.23
While under-representation undoubtedly exists, it remains unclear what precise role voters
play in this process. Non-white candidates appear to perform worse than others in parliamentary
elections, although the conclusions are necessarily tentative for elections in which only a small
number of such candidates stood.24 However, as more candidates are selected the possibilities
for aggregate data analysis expand. A recent examination of constituency-level data in 2010, for
example, noted that in areas with relatively few non-white electors, ethnic minority candidates
remain less successful in winning votes.25 Of course, it is also possible that in the small number
of constituencies containing relatively high proportions of non-white electors that support for
ethnic candidates is higher than expected.26
Two recent studies have shed a little more light on possible discrimination at the
parliamentary level. One study of the 2010 general election notes that political incumbents
could expect a gain of 2 percentage points in vote share when an ethnic minority candidate
challenged them.27 This advantage doubles when two minority ethnic challengers are listed on
the ballot. After taking party competition into account, the authors conclude that in some close
contests, an ethnic minority challenger could spell the difference between victory and defeat for
an incumbent.28 A second study of the same election examines the relationship between votes
and candidates’ ethnic origins.29 Although the study’s original survey design does not permit a
comprehensive analysis of the 100+ constituencies in which a minority ethnic candidate stood
in 2010, the authors conclude that white British voters are less likely to vote for Muslim
candidates, although they are unable to state that this amounts to a penalty for such candidates at
the ballot box.
Inevitably, exploring the impact on voting when minority ethnic candidates contest elections
in Britain is hampered by the fact that relatively small numbers of candidates are contesting a
limited range of elections. Moreover, the existing research focuses almost exclusively on
parliamentary elections, where certain factors may come into play – not least of which is
that these contests are more high profile than others, and voters may have more information
about candidates than would otherwise be the case. By contrast, local elections in Britain are
less visible contests in which many voters will only encounter candidates when examining the
21 Local Government Association 2011.
22 Thrasher et al. 2013.
23 Adolino 1998; Fielding and Geddes 1998; Geddes 1993, 1995; Saggar and Geddes 2000.
24 le Lohé 1993, 1998.
25 Curtice, Fisher, and Ford 2010.
26 Curtice and Steed 1997.
27 Stegmaier, Lewis-Beck, and Smets 2013.
28 Stegmaier, Lewis-Beck, and Smets 2013, 283.
29 Fisher et al. 2014.
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ballot paper.30 In the context of this article, however, this lack of prior information is of no
concern. It is not the candidate’s actual ethnic origin that interests us, but rather voters’
perceptions of candidate ethnicity and the effect this has on how they vote. A variety of field
experiments have been used to detect discrimination,31 but while these provide insights into the
level and direction of prejudice, they are not a substitute for examining the effects in actual
election data. Of course, inferring evidence of discrimination from ecological data also has
risks: the fact that some classes of persons (ethnic minorities) comprise a smaller-than-expected
fraction of a target group (candidates, the elected) may be explained by factors other than
discrimination. Nevertheless, if aggregate data analysis demonstrates that candidates across
different ethnic categories experience variable levels of electoral support, then it is important to
at least measure the nature and size of that effect.
DATA
A previous article32 highlighted the presence of alphabetic bias in local voting in Britain where
candidates are listed in order of family name on the ballot paper. This article extends that
analysis and considers whether voters also show preferences towards candidates according to
their ethnic origin. Election candidates are not required to self-identify ethnic origin, and
published sources are of little assistance in this regard. Instead, in common with research
elsewhere,33 we use computer software to identify ethnic origin, largely based on family names
although first names are also used. The OriginsInfo software examines the distribution of names
from published registers of electors and other sources and classifies them according to the most
likely ethnic origins. The software distinguishes 200 Origins codes/categories that fall
into thirteen principal groupings. Because a large majority of local election candidates are
classified as having British origins, this analysis reduces the overall classification into just three
categories – British (Anglo-Saxon/Celtic), European and non-European.34 Comparing the
results from this classification method with survey responses from local election candidates who
self-identified ethnic origin demonstrates that the OriginsInfo software provides a reliable
measure of ethnicity.35
The software assesses the cultural origin of each candidate’s name after cross-referencing
with two external files. The first of these contains 2.5 million family names and their
corresponding Origins codes, while the second has 0.7 million forenames that are also classified
according to ethnicity. Any conflict between the codes of the personal and family names is
resolved on the basis of the confidence scores, which are held against each personal and family
name on these reference files. Thus Manfred Mann would be coded as German (European in our
30 McDermott 1998.
31 Booth, Leigh, and Vargonova 2012; Kaas and Manger 2012; McGinnity and Lunn 2011; Terkildsen 1993.
32 Webber et al. 2014.
33 Cummins et al. 1999; Fieldhouse and Cutts 2008a, 2008b; Harding, Dews, and Simpson 1999; Lakha,
Gorman, and Mateos 2011; Mateos 2007; Nanchal et al. 2001; Ryan, Lawrence, and Wilson 2012.
34 The terms British or Anglo-Saxon/Celtic are used interchangeably in this article and refer to all surnames/
forenames whose ethnic roots lie in England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland. The category of ‘European’ contains
names whose ethnic origins lie in such European countries as Germany, France, Netherlands, Italy, Poland and
Russia but also includes British South Africa, for example. The third category of ‘non-European’ is simply those
names that fall outside the other two categories. While the software is capable of more fine-grained classifica-
tions, for example Bangladeshi or Indian, describing more than the three categories outlined above would lead to
problems with relatively small numbers of cases, particularly in the earlier part of the time period reviewed here.
A full list of Origins codes and ethnic classification can be obtained from the authors.
35 Thrasher et al. 2013.
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classification) but William Mann would be coded as English (British). This is because Manfred and
William are more culturally diagnostic personal names than is Mann as a family name. In order for
names such as Manfred, William and Mann to be associated with a cultural grouping, a file was
created containing the names of some 700 million individuals based on the names of residents of
twenty different countries and sourced from a variety of different types of administrative records.
The set of rules that causes a particular cultural grouping to be associated with each individual
name are complex but include, for example, the relative frequency of different names in different
countries (Manfred is more common in Germany than anywhere else). A further example is the
close association between some forenames and surnames (people named Declan tend to have Irish
surnames). The software can also parse text strings within particular names (for example, most
surnames ending in -nejad are classified as of Iranian origin).
The voting data are those recorded by Plymouth University’s Elections Centre, which holds a
comprehensive record of local government elections in Britain. The data examined here relate to
the post-1973 reorganization of local government structure and include all elections for county/
region/borough and district authorities (parish councils are not included) prior to and including
the 2012 contests, with the exception of local elections in Scotland after 2003 when simple
plurality voting was replaced by the single transferable vote. Over this forty-year period, some
690,047 candidates stood for election.
The number of cases is reduced for this analysis. All unopposed candidates (N = 20,285) are
naturally excluded. Also excluded are a relatively small number of candidates (N = 3,297)
where the software does not recognize and cannot classify the candidate’s name. A key step in
case selection concerns district magnitude (the number of vacancies). In the case of elections in
which district magnitude is greater than one (310,286 candidates involved), three further
selection criteria are necessary. First, the analysis considers a subset of parties (Conservative,
Labour, Liberal Democrat (including candidates that stood as Liberals and later Liberal/Social
Democrat Alliance), Nationalists in Scotland and Wales, Greens, UKIP and BNP) because the
dataset only lists many other smaller parties as ‘Others’. Secondly, because in these multi-
member districts the main interest is in a candidate’s relative position within his/her own party’s
slate of candidates, it follows that when we are unable to classify the ethnicity of a single
candidate within the list we must also exclude all other candidates standing for the same party in
that election. Thirdly, and for the same reason, we exclude all cases of incomplete party slates.
For example, if a party fields fewer candidates than there are vacancies, this slate and these
candidates are excluded from the analysis.36 This selection process still leaves the ethnic origins
and relative votes of 233,246 candidates available for analysis.
In wards that elected a single councillor (359,426 candidates contested this type of seat), case
selection is contingent on the requirement to measure the change in party vote share across two
consecutive elections. Here, a consecutive election takes account of the usual four-year election
cycle, even in local authorities that hold more frequent elections. The requirement to compare
across the electoral cycle means excluding election pairs if boundary changes were
implemented, if the number of vacancies temporarily increased because a casual vacancy
was filled or if a party fielded a candidate for one rather than both contests. Application of these
selection criteria leaves 175,921 candidates available for analysis.
36 One reviewer suggested that this step was unnecessary and that such cases could be included. However,
inclusion of incomplete slates (for example, two candidates in a three-member ward) will infer a spurious
association between slate position and finishing position. The chances of finishing in third position are non-
existent in the above example of two candidates but three vacancies. For complete slates, candidates have a one
in three chance of finishing third, theoretically speaking, assuming that there is no association between slate and
finishing positions.
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The structure of the data analysis is determined by the number of vacancies to be filled in
each ward election, beginning with multi-member wards (district magnitudes are mostly two or
three, but extend to twelve in some examples) before considering single-member wards. In the
case of wards with multiple vacancies we consider candidates’ relative performance within their
own party’s slate. After taking into consideration each candidate’s position within the party slate
of candidates (located on the actual ballot paper according to alphabetical order of surnames
first, second or third within a party slate of three candidates, for example), the two main
variables of interest are (1) each candidate’s finishing position within the party slate after the
votes are counted and (2) each candidate’s personal vote expressed as a percentage of the best
vote for his/her particular party in that ward. For example, in a three-member ward featuring
three Labour candidates who received 1,000, 750 and 500 votes, respectively, those candidates
would have personal votes of 100 per cent, 75 per cent and 50 per cent.
In the case of single-member wards, the analysis instead compares the party change in vote
share for each ward relative to the party’s mean change in vote share across all contested wards
for any given election year. For example, for the Conservative Party we measure the mean
change in vote share across all wards that held elections in say, both 2008 and 2012 (allowing
for the four-year cycle) and then observe for each separate ward whether the change in share for
the party is above, equal to or below the mean change. For each ward and for each comparable
election pair we note the candidate’s ethnic origin as determined by the OriginsInfo software. In
effect this equates to two sets of three-way categories (for each election a party may have a
candidate who is classified as ‘British’, ‘European’ or ‘non-European’), resulting in nine
possible permutations. Three of these permutations, or ‘transitions’ as we term them, would be
in cases in which a British candidate at the first election is succeeded again by a British
candidate (possibly the incumbent seeking re-election, of course) or a European or non-
European candidate. Six similar permutations follow when a European/non-European stands in
the first election. Since any alphabetic bias is likely to be rather small (although evidence shows
that even in single-member ward elections contested by just two candidates there is a very slight
bias towards the candidate placed at the top of the ballot),37 the analysis considers whether
relative change in vote is associated with candidates’ ethnic origin.
The research literature suggests that the nature and level of discrimination may vary over time.
Accordingly, for both the multi-member and single-member analyses, the data are subsequently
divided into four separate time periods. For this article these periods are largely determined by the
nature of the electoral cycle and by the frequency of elections, but future research may seek to fine-
tune this selection process in order to establish more precisely how voters’ behaviour in local
elections is connected to changes in attitudes within the broader society.
PATTERNS OF VOTING IN MULTI-MEMBER WARDS
Focusing initially on complete party slates in two- and three-member wards, we consider the
association between a candidate’s vote and their relative ballot position (relative to candidates
standing for the same party) after controlling for ethnicity. If the performance of candidates
from the same party is unaffected by such conditions, then each candidate in two-member wards
has a 50 per cent chance of winning the most votes, and each candidate in three-member wards
has a one-in-three chance of finishing first. We test these hypotheses using Chi-square and
Student’s t statistics.
37 Webber et al. 2014.
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Table 1 describes both two- and three-member wards in terms of a candidate’s ballot position on
the party slate, controlling for ethnic category and their finishing position within the party slate. In
two-member wards, instead of a 50/50 split, we find that 64 per cent of candidates listed first
finished at the top of the party’s slate. The picture changes, however, when we also control for
different ethnic categories. For the most numerous category, British, 65 per cent of those listed first
also finished first. For European candidates the comparable figure is 58 per cent, while for non-
Europeans it is just 43 per cent. When a British candidate is listed second in party order, then in 36
per cent of cases he or she performs the best out of his or her party. However, just 29 per cent of
European candidates and 20 per cent of non-Europeans finish in top position when they are listed
second in party order. Three-member wards reveal a similar story. British candidates perform better
than their party colleagues in the other ethnic categories, with all candidates benefitting from being
listed in the top position (relatively speaking) on the ballot paper. For example, non-European
candidates listed third on their party slate were the best-performing candidate in just 12 per cent of
cases. All differences are statistically significant using chi-square tests.38
TABLE 1 Candidate Finishing Position by Ballot Position within Party Slate, Controlling
for Ethnic Origin in Two- and Three-member Wards
Finishing position within party slate
(Row %)
Vacancies Ethnic origins Ballot position within party slate 1 2 3
2 a: British 1 65.0 35.0
2 36.4 63.6
Total 50.7 49.3
b: European 1 57.9 42.1
2 28.8 71.2
Total 43.6 56.4
c: Non-European 1 43.3 56.7
2 20.0 80.0
Total 31.7 68.3
Total 1 64.3 35.7
2 35.7 64.3
Total 50.0 50.0
3 a: British 1 50.8 30.5 18.7
2 31.9 41.8 26.3
3 20.3 28.7 51.0
Total 34.3 33.7 32.1
b: European 1 41.7 33.4 24.9
2 23.0 38.2 38.8
3 12.3 21.6 66.0
Total 26.1 31.3 42.5
c: Non-European 1 33.5 31.1 35.4
2 18.4 35.3 46.4
3 11.8 18.3 69.8
Total 21.8 28.4 49.8
Total 1 49.5 30.7 19.8
2 30.9 41.3 27.8
3 19.6 28.0 52.5
Total 33.3 33.3 33.3
38 Throughout the article, reported significance tests are at 5 per cent or better.
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This preliminary examination of the data shows an association between finishing position and
ethnic origin, but it does not fully examine the extent of that association. One method for
calibrating this is to calculate each candidate’s within-party share, where each party’s top-placed
candidate’s vote represents 100 per cent and other votes are some proportion of that figure – the
relative vote share (Figure 1). In two-member vacancies the mean relative vote share for British
candidates listed first is 96.4 per cent; for Europeans it is 95.7 per cent and for non-Europeans it
is 93.3 per cent. There is more than a 3-point difference between the British and non-European
candidates. In three-member wards the difference is roughly the same (95.5 per cent versus 92.0
per cent). When listed second on the party slate in two-member wards, white British candidates
receive a mean relative vote share of 92.9 per cent of the maximum and Europeans obtain 91.3
per cent, while the mean value for non-European candidates falls to 88.3 per cent. This is almost
a 5-percentage-point difference between British and non-European candidates from the same
party when listed in the same position on the party slate. In three-member wards, British
candidates listed third on their party’s slate perform better than non-European candidates in an
equivalent position (93.4 per cent compared to 89.3 per cent). The slopes of these lines are
roughly similar (incidentally, indicating the same degree of alphabetical bias for each of the
ethnic categories, and the error bars are not overlapping), which indicates a significant
difference39 in the vote performance among the ethnic categories.
Of course, this analysis does not include all of the factors that impact the level of electoral
support, including incumbency, characteristics of the local authority and the level of party
competition within each ward. But the advantage of such a large number of cases is that it is
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Fig. 1. Mean relative vote share by ballot position within party slate
Note: along the horizontal axis is the ballot position within the party slate (1, 2 or 3 according to the number
of vacancies). The vertical axis shows the mean relative vote share. Each line represents one of three ethnic
categories, and error bars show the 95 per cent confidence interval.
39 These differences are all statistically significant according to Student’s t test. Tests are adjusted for all
pairwise comparisons using the Bonferroni correction.
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possible to construct interesting analyses based on particular configurations of candidate
competition.
The first such example considers a subset of 690 party slates (1,743 candidates) in two- and
three-member wards in which parties selected only candidates from the ‘European’ and ‘non-
European’ categories. When voters can only choose between candidates with these ethnic
characteristics, non-European candidates still do not perform as well as their party colleagues in
terms of relative vote share (Figure 2). For example, in a three-member ward a European
candidate might expect to obtain 97 per cent of relative vote share, but for a non-European that
falls to 94 per cent.
An even stricter condition may be applied to this subset by stipulating that each party slate
must contain at least one candidate from each of the two respective ethnic categories – that is,
the slate cannot comprise all European or all non-European candidates. This condition reduces
the number of party slates to 394 candidates, and consequently the 95 per cent confidence
intervals become wider. Despite this, the pattern continues: relative vote shares reduce as we
move down the party list, with non-European candidates more disadvantaged than their
European colleagues.
Finally, we select three-member vacancies where parties fielded a full slate of candidates
drawn from all three ethnic categories. There are 1,446 candidates in 482 slates (mostly drawn
from the London borough elections) in this particular subset. Figure 3 has six configurations of
party list order, with British candidates labelled ‘a’, European ‘b’ and non-European ‘c’. For
example, if the pattern in a ward ballot paper for a given party is a British candidate, followed
by European and then a non-European candidate in the third position, then the candidate
structure is ‘abc’. The first two configurations, ‘abc’ and ‘acb’, are those in which the British
candidate is listed first in the party ballot order. Their mean relative vote shares are 98 and 99
per cent. When such candidates are listed in the second place (configurations 3 and 5) the
mean relative vote shares are 97 and 96 per cent, and in the third place the mean values are
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Fig. 2. Mean relative vote share by ballot position within party slate when only European and non-
European candidates contest
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93 and 94 per cent. When non-Europeans appear in the first party slate position (cab, cba) their
mean relative vote share is approximately 93.2 per cent – worse than British candidates
appearing in the third position. When non-European candidates are in the third position on the
slate (abc, bac) their mean relative shares are 86 and 85 per cent. The performance of European
candidates lies somewhere between that of British and non-European candidates.
It is clear, therefore, that in addition to relative ballot position, a candidate’s vote may also be
affected positively or negatively by perceived ethnic origin. An important question is whether
these conditions (ballot position on party’s slate and ethnicity) are of equal importance. A linear
regression model tests for this (Table 2, overall model, which examines data relating to the
entire period, 1973–2012) using relative vote share as the dependent variable. The variable,
ballot position on the party slate, has a significant negative impact on the dependent variable:
relative vote share is expected to be lower for candidates placed lower down the party slate.
Other things being equal, one position lower on the party list for a candidate results in a decline
in relative vote share of 1.6 percentage points.
Ballot position generally also has a negative impact; each step down the ballot paper
corresponds to a decrease of 0.3 percentage points on the dependent variable. The ‘European’
and ‘non-European’ dummy variables provide the contrast with British candidates. European
candidates should expect a 1.4-point lower relative vote than their British counterparts
(equivalent to moving one position lower on the party slate), but for non-Europeans their
expected relative share is fully 5 percentage points lower (almost three times the effect of party
list position!).
Incumbents seeking re-election should expect an additional 2.3-point advantage to their
relative vote position. There are a number of statistically significant interactions across variables
within the model. For example, the interaction between incumbency and ethnic origins shows
that European and non-European councillors each gain an additional 1.3 and 2.8 percentage
points, respectively, in their anticipated relative vote share (perhaps once elected they become
better known to local electors). Also worth noting is that the interaction of incumbency with
ballot position on the party slate suggests that the negative effects of appearing lower down the
ballot are to some degree overcome for incumbents.
The inclusion in the model of local authority-level information about the concentration of
non-white populations from the 2011 census is designed to test whether such areas might vote
differently in respect of candidates’ ethnic origins – local authorities with relatively high non-
white populations may be less likely to demonstrate name discrimination towards non-
Europeans. The variable separates the top 10 per cent of local authorities with non-white
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Fig. 3. Mean relative vote share, controlling for candidate ethnic origin in three-member wards
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TABLE 2 Linear Regression Model for Relative Vote Shares in Multi-member Wards
Overall 1973–1982 1983–1992 1993–2002 2003–2012
(Intercept) 97.01 (0.05)*** 96.07 (0.08)*** 97.68 (0.12)*** 99.08 (0.12)*** 98.76 (0.13)***
Party slate position −1.58 (0.04)*** −0.99 (0.05)*** −2.48 (0.09)*** −3.12 (0.08)*** −3.42 (0.09)***
Ballot position −0.32 (0.01)*** −0.21 (0.02)*** −0.04 (0.02) −0.20 (0.02)*** −0.25 (0.02)***
Ethnic origins
[c: Non-European] −5.03 (0.21)*** −5.12 (0.61)*** −3.92 (0.55)*** −3.71 (0.42)*** −4.98 (0.31)***
[b: European] −1.44 (0.13)*** −0.56 (0.22)*** −1.05 (0.29)*** −1.71 (0.26)*** −2.27 (0.29)***
[a: British] 0a 0a 0a 0a 0a
[Incumbent] 2.27 (0.09)*** 2.37 (0.19)*** 1.54 (0.20)*** 0.61 (0.17)*** 0.72 (0.17)***
[Incumbent] × [c: Non-European] 2.81 (0.23)*** 4.71 (0.80)*** 1.33 (0.62)* 1.15 (0.38)** 2.85 (0.35)***
[Incumbent] × [b: European] 1.31 (0.19)*** 0.54 (0.37) 1.09 (0.38)** 1.71 (0.34)*** 1.98 (0.37)***
[Incumbent] × Party slate position 0.38 (0.05)*** 0.07 (0.10) 0.91 (0.11)*** 1.55 (0.09)*** 1.82 (0.10)***
[Local Authority with high% non-white] 1.87 (0.04)*** 2.43 (0.07)*** 2.53 (0.08)*** 1.39 (0.08)*** 1.02 (0.11)***
[c: Non-European] × [high% non-white] −0.28 (0.25) −1.22 (0.77) −1.07 (0.62) −0.31 (0.47) 1.15 (0.38)**
[b: European] × [high% non-white] −1.31 (0.19)*** −0.79 (0.30)** −0.70 (0.36)* −1.52 (0.38)*** −1.58 (0.43)***
N = 233,209 72,951 46,761 51,831 61,667
Note: dependent variable = relative vote share. Table entries are parameter estimates with robust standard errors in brackets. Dummy variables are
named by their indicator category and shown enclosed in square brackets. ***p< 0.001; **p< 0.01; *p< 0.05.
aSet to zero because this parameter is redundant.
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populations from all other authorities.40 The model suggests that the overall level of relative
vote is higher (that is, closer to 100 for all party candidates) in authorities included in the top 10
per cent, but it does not show any further impact for non-European candidates standing in these
areas. There is, however, a clear additional disadvantage for European candidates.
Of course, the general model considers electoral data over forty years, a period in which
Britain has undergone a great deal of social change and experienced periodic shifts of opinion
towards people of non-native ethnic origin. There is insufficient space here to examine in any
great detail how such changes might have affected local election results, and therefore we only
briefly consider the effects of time on voters’ responses to names on the ballot.41 Accordingly,
we sub-divide the data into four equal time periods (see Table 2).
The results of this procedure are rather promising. For example, in the 1970s the impact of a
candidate having a non-European name is more than 5 percentage points. This effect reduces in
size by more than 1 percentage point over the next two decades only to revert to its former size
after the events of 2001 and the subsequent ‘war on terror’. This is not yet a statement about
cause and effect, but it certainly suggests that the relationship should be investigated further. In
the case of candidates with European names, it appears that the level of name discrimination has
steadily risen over time from half of 1 percentage point to four times that in the most recent
decade. In local authorities with relatively high levels of non-white residents, this name
discrimination has become twice as strong over the last two decades compared to the 1973–92
period. There are also interesting differences in the effect of incumbency on European and non-
European councillors. Incumbency is growing in importance for local council members with
European names but for non-Europeans it is more changeable.
Finally, it appears that the effects of alphabetic bias within the party slate are becoming
stronger over time, while ballot position itself remains more or less constant. There are a
number of possible explanations for why position on the party slate is becoming more critical.
First, it may be that a growing number of voters are unaware that they have multiple votes and
are not using their full quota, which would disadvantage candidates placed lower in the order.42
Second, in some areas the social characteristics of the electorate are changing; areas with higher
ethnic populations favour non-British candidates placed towards the top of the party slate,
which operates in the opposite direction to the broader tendency to favour British candidates
over non-European ones. Third, given the relatively high incidence of split-ticket voting, the
alphabetic ordering of candidates may play a more critical role among voters willing to spread
their votes across candidates from different parties.43
The implications of the overall model on support for candidates may be best illustrated by
two hypothetical examples involving a four-member ward. In the first example the ward is
located in a local authority area that has a largely white population. The candidate is a non-
incumbent who is in fourth place on her party’s slate and in seventh position on the ballot paper.
If the candidate is of British origin she can expect to obtain an average relative vote share of 89
per cent – 7 points lower than her colleague placed at the top of the party slate by virtue of
alphabetic ordering. If her ethnic origin is European, however, she would receive a relative vote
share of 87 per cent, and just 83 per cent if she is non-European. To reach parity with British
40 During the time period, local authorities have undergone some structural changes. In the case of local
authorities that no longer existed in 2011, we based their classification upon larger geographical areas that could
still be identified. For example, district councils that existed prior to structural changes in the mid-1990s but were
then abolished were classified according to the county areas that they once occupied.
41 We are grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers and the editor for making this suggestion.
42 Rallings, Thrasher, and Borisyuk 2009.
43 Rallings and Thrasher 2003.
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candidates in this example we would need to move European candidates one position higher on
the party slate and on the ballot paper (that is, third rather than fourth position on the party slate
and sixth on the ballot paper). For non-Europeans, parity with British candidates is only reached
when the candidate is elevated to first position on the party slate and fourth on the ballot paper.
The second example addresses the impact of both incumbency and the ethnic characteristics
of the local authority population. The hypothetical ward is located within a local authority that
contains a relatively high proportion of non-white residents. The incumbent appears on the
seventh line of the ballot paper and his party colleagues are all listed before him. In this
situation, a British incumbent might expect to receive an average 94 per cent of relative vote
share. The mean relative vote share of an incumbent of European origin is lower at 93 per cent
(non-European incumbents might expect 92 per cent), which is still a penalty but not as great as
in the previous example. European incumbents should be placed one position closer to the top
of the party’s list to reach parity: third on the slate and sixth on the ballot paper. However, the
equivalent position for non-European incumbents would mean being placed second on the
party’s list and fifth on the ballot paper.
Can we also estimate the effects identified here in terms of actual electoral outcomes? For the
data included in the analysis (that is, only those cases/candidates for which our selection criteria
were met), the mean party vote share is 34 per cent. In effect, this means that the model estimate
of a 5-percentage-point difference in relative vote converts into an average 1.7-percentage-point
difference in vote shares between British and non-European candidates. Within the aggregate
data, the gap between the ‘lowest’ winner (for example, in a three-member ward the person who
captured the third seat) and the ‘closest’ loser (the candidate finishing fourth in this example)
was smaller than 1.7 percentage points in 6,872 wards. Although it is a small difference in
expected vote share, the outcome in a considerable number of wards may have been affected.
Here (when considering the difference between winners and losers), we do not control for
party (a winner and a loser may be from the same or different parties), and we use average
figures for party shares. To make more robust estimates, we consider only the particular cases of
‘split’ wards where a party has both winners and losers, for example, two Conservative
candidates stood but only one was elected. The vote-share difference between winners and
losers from the same party in these split wards can be recalculated in terms of relative vote share
(the difference in vote shares divided by the maximum of the party’s share). There are 3,307
party slates in 2,894 split wards where the difference in relative vote share between a loser and a
winner is less than 5.03 percentage points and where, theoretically at least, the candidate
selection could have impacted on the outcome. Thus, we have two methods of estimating the
effect of name discrimination in multi-member wards. They suggest that some seats in 2,894–
6,872 wards could have been won by a different person had the configurations of candidate
ethnicity been different. Since this part of the analysis considered 123,115 seats in 47,782
wards, this means that between 6.1 per cent and 14.4 per cent of election results may have been
affected by name discrimination.
Having established that a person’s position on the ballot paper (both on the party slate and on
the entire list of candidates) and their perceived ethnic origin affect the likely vote, we return to
a puzzle that we first encountered when investigating alphabetic bias.44 Although the link
between a candidate’s relative success and alphabetic ordering appeared linear – the higher the
position on the ballot paper, the higher the success – some deviation from linearity was evident.
In particular, support for candidates with surnames in the first decile of surname ordering was
less than those in the second decile. At the time, we speculated that this departure from strict
44 Webber et al. 2014.
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linearity might be related either to the ‘second-best’ phenomenon (people’s tendency to select
second- rather than first-listed choices) or might be explained by some ethnic characteristics of
surnames. Figure 4a, which mostly reproduces Figure 1 from an earlier article45 but reverses the
vertical axis used there, shows some non-linearity of association between surname deciles and
candidates’ mean finishing position. However, when we consider candidate surname deciles
(quintiles in the case of European and non-European candidates) separately in Figure 4b (which
uses the same metric on the vertical axis as Figure 4a but shows a broader range of values), the
line relating to British is now smoothed and clearly confirms that these candidates do better than
their fellow European and non-European candidates. The mean finishing position of European
candidates (where the linear position between finishing position and surname quintiles is also
apparent) is generally better than that for non-European candidates across all surname
categories. This evidence suggests that the explanation for the curve in Figure 4a relates to
candidate ethnicity, and by implication to variations in the pattern of the ethnic composition
across surname deciles.
The ethnic composition for each surname decile (Figure 5) reveals that the first decile
contains the lowest percentage of British candidates (89.9 per cent), a relatively high percentage
of Europeans (4.8 per cent) and the highest percentage of non-Europeans (5.2 per cent). The
ethnic mix of surnames lying within this first decile probably explains the presence of the non-
linearity observed in Figure 4a. By contrast, the second decile has 94.8 per cent British, 3.3 per
cent European and just 1.9 per cent non-Europeans. A chi square test shows that these variations
in ethnic composition across surname deciles are statistically significant and the puzzle appears
to have been solved. Thus far, in the case of multi-member electoral districts it appears that a
candidate’s finishing position is not only related to his/her relative position within the party slate
but also the ethnic characteristics of their surname. Arguably, the greater likelihood of non-
European candidates appearing higher on the ballot might be mitigating some of the
disadvantages associated with name discrimination.
To the top
(finishing first)
Mean
To the bottom
(finishing last)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Anglo-Saxon/ Celtic
European
Non-European
Error bars: 95% CI
(a) (b)
Fig. 4. Mean finishing position by surname deciles/quintiles
45 Figure 1 from the earlier paper (Webber et al. 2014) differs slightly from Figure 4a. The former describes
1973–2011 multi- and single-member data together (N = 657,704), while the latter relates to 1973–2012 multi-
member elections only (N = 309,760).
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PATTERNS OF VOTING IN SINGLE-MEMBER WARDS
In contrast with the multi-member ward cases, single-member electoral wards are now
examined in terms of change in party vote share between each pair of elections after controlling
for the succession of candidates (or not) according to ethnic origin name characteristics. Each
‘status’ is labelled in the same way as in the previous analysis: a = ‘British’, b = ‘European’
and c = ‘non-European’. Accordingly, if a British councillor elected in the first election seeks
re-election (or retires and is succeeded by another candidate with a name suggesting British
ethnic origin) the transition is labelled ‘aa’. Should a party contest the first election with a non-
European candidate but at the second election choose a ‘European’ candidate, then the transition
would be labelled ‘cb’ and so on. This procedure produces nine variants of two-letter
combinations.
Of course, votes for local election candidates are a function of both local and national factors.
In order to eliminate the effect of this ‘national’ trend we consider relative change in vote
shares, that is, the difference in each party’s ward vote share change compared to the national
change46 in vote share for the same party. Thus, if a party’s ward vote share declines by
5 percentage points but the national vote share change for that party is −10 points, then its
relative decline is +5 since it performed 5 points better (−5 minus –10 equals +5) than the
national party did.
Figure 6 shows the mean of relative change in vote share for the nine possible conditions
(‘aa’, ‘ab’, …, ‘cc’) in single-member wards for the period 1973–2012 (N = 174,530). When
British candidates participate in both elections (case ‘aa’; n = 159,108) there is no difference in
the ward performance compared to the national performance; this is unsurprising since the
national average is calculated using mostly these types of wards. In the two other examples, a
British candidate in the first election is not followed by another British candidate; thus the
party’s relative vote share change declines. When ‘European’ candidates instead contest the
second election (‘ab’, n = 4,027), the mean relative decline is 0.7 percentage points and for
non-European candidates (‘ac’, n = 2,374) it is 0.8 points; both findings are statistically
significant. In addition to the ‘aa’ category there are two other categories in which a party
selects a British candidate to contest the second election (‘ba’, n = 3,871 and ‘ca’, n = 1,589).
In the former there is an increase in the party’s relative vote share of 0.5 percentage points and a
much larger increment of 1.5 points when a British candidate replaces a non-European
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Fig. 5. Percentage of candidates in ethnic category by surname decile
46 National change is calculated by averaging changes in the party’s share of vote across relevant wards. Thus
the mean of relative changes is 0.
428 THRASHER, BORISYUK, RALLINGS AND WEBBER
candidate. For the remaining four combinations (bb, bc, cb and cc, total number of cases here is
3,561), however, mean relative change does not reach statistical significance, possibly because
the number of cases is rather small.
To investigate the association between candidates’ relative success and the pattern of
candidate succession in single-member wards alongside other factors, including incumbency,
the number of candidates and local authority-level information about the concentration of non-
white populations, we use a linear regression model with relative change in vote share as the
dependent variable.
Similar to the previous analysis of multi-member cases (shown in Table 2), there is a general
model for the period 1973–2012 for single-seat contests as well as four separate models that use
the same time periods as before (see Table 3). The overall model clearly shows that the variable
Transitions, the pattern of succession between elections, has a significant impact on the
dependent variable. Two of these transitions, ‘ab’ and ‘ac’ (British to European and British to
non-European) have negative impacts on vote change (approximately 1 percentage point lower)
when compared to the reference category, ‘aa’. By contrast, the other two transitions, ‘ba’ and
‘ca’ (the reverse of the two transitions resulting in a negative impact on the dependent) have a
positive impact on vote change: less than 1 point in the case of a European to British transition
but almost 2 points if a non-European is succeeded. Other transitions, for example ‘cc’, a non-
European in both elections, do not reach statistical significance. As expected, the change in the
number of candidates contesting has a significant negative impact on the dependent variable.
The model also shows that for incumbent British councillors seeking re-election in local
authorities with a high concentration of non-whites, there is a significant negative influence on
change in vote share.
The remaining four models, which focus on different time periods, contain some noteworthy
features. Although the set of independent variables described as ‘transitions’ continues to be
significant across the different periods, the details of this influence alter to some extent. Looking
at the four transitions that are significant in the overall model (ab, ac, ba, ca), we do
not see much change in the direction of influence within the four time periods. Although
the size of the effect of a non-European to British transition (ca) appears to decrease over time,
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Fig. 6. Mean relative change in vote share controlling for candidate successions
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TABLE 3 Linear Regression Model for Relative Change in Vote Shares in Single-member Wards
Overall model 1973–1982 1983–1992 1993–2002 2003–2012
(Intercept) 0.44 (0.03)*** 1.25 (0.13)*** 0.37 (0.05)*** 0.17 (0.05)** 0.71 (0.06)***
Transitions *** *** *** *** ***
[cc: non-European ! non-European] 0.13 (0.46) 6.37 (3.57) 2.15 (1.17) 1.24 (0.89) −1.60 (0.61)**
[cb: non-European ! European] −0.09 (0.96) −1.49 (2.18) 0.26 (1.51) 0.60 (1.49)
[ca: non-European ! British] 1.74 (0.24)*** 3.83 (1.41)** 2.12 (0.46)*** 1.51 (0.46)** 1.44 (0.37)***
[bc: European ! non-European] −0.06 (0.88) −0.18 (1.78) 1.25 (1.48) −1.19 (1.33)
[bb: European ! European] −0.07 (0.28) −0.43 (1.31) 0.53 (0.48) −0.48 (0.50) −0.30 (0.51)
[ba: European ! British] 0.41 (0.15)** 0.31 (0.63) 0.12 (0.25) 0.21 (0.27) 1.08 (0.27)***
[ac: British ! non-European] −0.96 (0.27)*** −2.56 (1.78) −1.26 (0.52)* −0.96 (0.47)* −0.96 (0.41)*
[ab: British ! European] −0.79 (0.16)*** −0.69 (0.71) −0.59 (0.29)* −1.05 (0.28)*** −0.72 (0.31)*
[aa: British ! British]a 0a 0a 0a 0a 0a
Change in number of candidates −4.04 (0.03)*** −5.17 (0.13)*** −4.62 (0.06)*** −4.06 (0.06)*** −3.42 (0.05)***
[Incumbent] × [Ethnicity] × [Non-white population] * * * * *
[Incumbent] × [c: non-European] × [high% non-white
population]
−0.10 (0.70) −4.56 (6.25) −0.99 (1.61) −1.77 (1.31) 1.58 (0.97)
[Incumbent] × [b: European] × [high% non-white population] 0.11 (0.60) −1.60 (3.20) −0.48 (0.96) 0.40 (1.15) 0.35 (0.95)
[Incumbent] × [a: British] × [high% non-white population] −0.43 (0.11)*** −1.85 (0.42)*** 0.67 (0.19)*** −0.30 (0.18) −1.57 (0.23)***
[Incumbent] × [c: non-European] × [low% non-white
population]
0.03 (0.67) −7.00 (6.08) −1.18 (1.56) −0.78 (1.26) 0.95 (0.92)
[Incumbent] × [b: European] × [low% non-white population] 0.14 (0.40) −0.05 (1.71) 0.62 (0.70) −0.35 (0.70) 0.31 (0.75)
[Incumbent] × a: [British] × [low% non-white population] −0.09 (0.06) −0.50 (0.25)* 0.51 (0.11)*** −0.42 (0.10)*** −0.33 (0.12)**
[non-incumbent] × [c: non-European] × [high% non-white
population]
0.08 (0.35) −0.45 (2.22) −1.12 (0.73) 0.29 (0.66) 0.78 (0.51)
[non-incumbent] × [b: European] × [high% non-white
population]
0.09 (0.29) −0.65 (1.15) 0.40 (0.52) −0.27 (0.51) 0.50 (0.51)
[non-incumbent] × [a: British] × [high% non-white population] 0.09 (0.06) −0.39 (0.27) 0.22 (0.10) −0.02 (0.11) 0.32 (0.12)**
[non-incumbent] × [low% non-white population] 0a 0a 0a 0a 0a
N 174,194 10,653 61,961 57,068 44,512
Note: dependent variable = relative vote share. Table entries are parameter estimates with robust standard errors in brackets. Dummy variables are
named by their indicator categories and shown enclosed in square brackets. ***p< 0.001; **p< 0.01; *p< 0.05.
aSet to zero because this parameter is redundant.
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the size of the standard error in the 1973–82 model is very large, reflecting the rather small
number of cases in that category. However, the ‘cc’ transition, not significant in the overall
model, makes a significant negative impact on the dependent variable in the last decade. It also
appears from the interaction term, Incumbent x British x High non-white, that councillors with
British-sounding surnames in local authorities with relatively large non-white populations are
incurring a 2-percentage-point penalty in terms of change in relative vote shares.
The general model in Table 3 shows that in single-member wards there is clear evidence of name
discrimination. Short examples illustrate the implications of these findings. In the case of a local
authority containing a relatively small proportion of non-white residents, and where the election
candidates are non-incumbents, the model suggests that the consequence of a British candidate
being succeeded by a non-European candidate is that the party performs half of 1 percentage point
lower (−0.5) than expected. By contrast, if a European candidate is succeeded by a British one, a
party will experience a boost of almost 1 percentage point (+0.9) on its expected vote share. When
areas containing relatively large non-white populations are considered, the consequences of a
European candidate succeeding a British one on the party’s performance is lower than average
(−0.3), but replacing a European with a non-European actually improves the party’s performance
(+0.7). However, the succession pattern with the largest impact remains situations in which a non-
European is replaced by a British candidate. In such cases a party might expect a more than
2-percentage-point improvement (+2.3) on its expected vote. These examples demonstrate that
different candidate successions for single-member wards may result in changes of more than
2 percentage points in the expected relative change of vote share.
How might these differences in candidate succession have affected actual election outcomes?
For the data included in the modelling (174,194 candidates contesting 70,007 seats), we
estimate that up to 3,996 seats (5.7 per cent of the total) were won/lost by parties where the gap
between the winner and second-placed candidate was small enough that a different pattern of
ethnic transition may have reversed the positions of these candidates.
CONCLUSIONS
The evidence clearly points to name discrimination among some voters participating in local
elections in Britain. As a rough estimate, if around 4,000 to 5,000 local council seats are contested
annually, then the outcomes in about 200 of these are being decided, in part, by name recognition.
Some of these seats will be important for determining the balance of power on the council itself.
Although the general pattern shows that candidates with names suggesting a non-European ethnic
origin perform least well compared to candidates with surnames indicating a British origin, there is
also evidence that other factors, including local context and time, are relevant. Indeed, in local
authorities with a high proportion of non-Europeans it is candidates with European names that
appear at a disadvantage. It is perhaps understandable that local election voters want ‘people like
us’ to run their local council services. The initial analysis of time effects provides clues that voter
choices are sensitive to external events that temporarily affect attitudes towards particular groups in
society. Future research should focus on identifying the dynamics between voter responses to
names on the ballot paper and local, national (and even global) events.
Local parties, particularly those selecting candidates to fight council seats, are almost
certainly conscious of name recognition effects, and may even be able to calibrate them on a
ward-by-ward basis. Accordingly, they will be at least considering measures that place certain
types of candidates in some wards but not in others. The outcome may lead to a covert ‘zoning’
of seats that influences the types of candidates selected. Of course, local voters are free to
support candidates who seem to be appropriate choices to represent their area, but should local
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party selection processes effectively condone name recognition effects by simply trying to
mitigate them? Research involving interviews with local party members to assess how the
selection processes are impacted by name recognition effects and what measures, if any, to take
to accommodate them, should be undertaken to establish whether parties are affected equally.
Although it has explored ballot effects, the article has also produced a more accurate
description of the impact of alphabetic order. The earlier conclusion that the relationship was
almost linear should now be replaced with one that states that for British candidates, at least, the
relationship is entirely linear: in local elections, candidates listed towards the top of the ballot
paper perform better than those located towards the bottom. The effect increases with district
magnitude and the number of candidates contesting. In light of this overwhelming evidence,
it is difficult to see why Britain should not randomize ballot order for local elections. At the
very least, pilot programmes – similar to those that led to the expansion of postal voting, for
example – could be tested in some localities. However, changes in electoral administration are
unlikely to address the issue of name discrimination.
At a broader level, these findings build on research that investigates levels of discrimination
across diverse settings within British society.47 This apparent discrimination at the ballot box
reveals a preference for certain types of candidates over others based largely on names on the
ballot paper. Identifying and measuring discrimination has proved to be a challenge for survey
and experimental-based methods, but this application of name recognition software to local
election voting has demonstrated the clear potential of aggregate data analysis.
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